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I believe that the task of inventing better futures may stagger 
the imagination and paralyze hope, but we cannot relinquish 
this holy call.
—Emilio Ambasz, architect
Although Freud thought structurally (early on he employed the word “architecture” 
to designate the peculiar organization of hysteria; Freud, 1897), his theories never 
inspired experimentation in spatial thinkers that they did in narrative and visual 
artists—among whom filmmakers perhaps hold pride of place. (Lacan is the more 
usual link with film, but other studies have also emphasized Freud. See MacCannell, 
2000.)
 True, Freud rarely neglected to mark the site-specificity of the key mental 
events that set off his speculations—events befalling him or his patients, or even 
whole civilizations: the Acropolis, Vienna, Thebes, Egypt, Sinai. Yet space hardly 
seems as crucial to his theory as the newly effracted dimensions Freud discovered 
in time. Thus we recall his awakening to long-repressed memories when he finds 
himself on the Acropolis, and not the architectural wonders surrounding him in 
that spot (Freud, 1936). We focus more on the phobias induced in “Little Hans” 
by the horses in the streets of Vienna than on the streets themselves, or on the 
splendors of the Schoenbrunn Palace (although, it too, plays its part in Hans’ mental 
disturbance; Freud, 1909). And we think more about the unconscious desires of the 
son and his oedipal guilt (or his perverse enjoyment) than about the particular 
spatial arrangements of his mother’s bedroom, although Freud sometimes offers 
such details (Freud, 1909).
 If Freud uncovered the melodramatic return of a repressed ancient Thebes, 
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Egypt, or Sinai in today’s mental and cultural acts, we nonetheless regard his use of 
these sites more as historical turning points in subjective life than as particularized 
locations, specific built environments, or divine and natural landscapes. As for the 
way Rome figures in Freud, it is not its monumental architecture that counts, only 
the way it symbolized his father’s lack of place in civic life (whence his own fearful 
fascination with the eternal city). True, Freud did employ the excavation of Rome 
as a forceful analogy for Proustian “time lost” and repressed memories; for him, 
the archaeology of the Forum’s layer upon layer of buried histories chronicled the 
past of vanquished peoples and indexed the time of unremembered events. Yet even 
here Freud used the way the earth conceals three-dimensional objects to illustrate 
how psychical time superimposes one memory over another, without hinting at the 
reverse.
 What seemingly matters most in Freud’s style of psychoanalysis, then, are those 
temporal, historical events whose connections to the present are hidden, lost, and 
dropped out of the sequential narrative of life, but which have never actually been 
severed from it. Analysis attempts to recuperate these by means of an unrelentingly 
retrospective process: by pinpointing the moment of the trauma and by elaborating 
protocols of timing for the pacing and rhythm of the analyst’s interventions to 
reach it. That is, psychoanalytic procedures are devised in order to arrive at a 
singular, primal event, the moment when the original object of satisfaction was 
lost: an object whose loss is subsequently masked (and yet indirectly indicated) in 
myriad everyday disguises in the ordinary, familiar objects that are its substitutes, 
appearing as our wishes, daydreams, hallucinations, or delusions. A moment, 
then, is dropped from the history of the subject, but nonetheless impacts the whole 
ensuing chronicle of its mental life.
 In contrast to Freud’s uncompromising pursuit of and systematic investigation 
into the obscure operations of unconscious mental time, we find (at first blush) no 
parallel effort with respect to space. Nor do the manifestations of the unconscious 
in three-dimensional reality command a great deal of Freud’s attention. Freud, 
that is, does relatively little probing of spatial thinkers beyond, say, the sculptures 
of Michelangelo and the peculiar landscapes of Leonardo, although he obviously 
made some fuss over the spaces in which he himself worked at 19 Berggasse. 
Still, to mention Freud and space in the same breath brings mainly to mind his 
various two-dimensional sketches, his schemas of the topological systems, or 
his cartoonish graphics delineating the logically separated yet oddly continuous-
contiguous mental spaces of id, ego, and superego—slashed through smartly by 
a gap called “repression.” Freud’s miniaturized pictures of mental structure even 
manage to reduce the collective mentality of entire social groups to diagrammatic 
flatness, as when he illustrates the process whereby a Leader becomes a focal object 
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that replaces his followers’ individual ego ideals (Freud, 1922, p. 116).
 Freudian flatness, Lacan would eventually remind us, relates primarily to his 
enduring attention to the ego and its imaginary structuring—an ego that ceaselessly 
draws a controlled circle around itself while warding off the alternately graceful 
or awkward pirouettes of instinctual vicissitudes. Even Freud’s descriptions of 
the arcs and oblique circuits of drive are more like pencil drawings of serpentine 
lines than like constructs with mass, and more like verbal tropings (the twisting 
and turning aside from normal linguistic meaning and usage) than like three-
dimensional architectural objects.
 In Freud, that is, space seems to play analytical second fiddle to the temporality 
of psychical events. And so it seems, where the architectural object is concerned, 
it was up to Jacques Lacan and those he influenced to fill in the void of Freudian 
spatial inspiration. Lacan paid elaborate attention to Moebius strips, Klein 
bottles, knots, mathematical topology (1973), Baroque architecture and trompe 
l’oeil (1986), “Little Hans’s” maternal bedroom (1994), and anamorphosis 
(1973). Lacan’s seminar of 1964 (1973) developed the concept of the démontage 
(“dismantling”: sometimes translated as “deconstruction”) of the drives, which in 
turn “influenced” Jacques Derrida. Derrida is considered the French thinker who 
has most affected recent architectural practice, mainly through his critique of 
Heidegger’s “enframing” using Kant’s parergon; his work directly informs Peter 
Eisenman’s deconstructive architecture. (See Ledofsky, 2004, pp. 42–45.) A long 
detour is required, then, to mark out Freud’s architectural fortunes.
 More pointedly, it seems clear that our traditional sense of space has not been 
much budged by Freud—or certainly not as much as our conventional understanding 
of time, which at length has yielded to Freud’s complex rhythms of temporal 
contradictions and reversibilities. And yet, a case might be (and certainly remains 
to be) made that Freud’s own sense of space was equally revolutionary, and that we 
may have simply failed to acknowledge, much less appreciate, his radicality in its 
regard. (See MacCannell, 2003a).
 Let us for a moment reconsider the space we encounter at the end of an analysis. 
Here we will have reached the very first time that space was framed for the psyche. 
Poised on the threshold of an aperture, we look back through it to the beginning of 
the patient’s subjective time, looking toward the empty place of the missing object 
of satisfaction—an object whose loss will have motivated the entire psychical 
history of that subject.
 Even the most successful analysis, however, never “finally” arrives at this lost 
object. If it is true that the primal scene of the object’s dramatic cleavage from 
us is never actually accessible directly, this is due less to its loss in the “mists 
of time” than to the special mental space its loss has shaped: a space fashioned 
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around and formed by a fantasy unconsciously constructed to obscure the object’s 
loss. Unconscious fantasy locates the object of satisfaction as somehow still in 
the picture—still there, or rather, not yet lost. This fantasy models or determines 
all of the subject’s subsequent desires in a very particular way. It frames all “real” 
objects by mobilizing them to fill in for the missing object: they will promise, yet 
can never deliver, its form of satisfaction. Unconscious fantasy thus makes the 
reality experienced through its frame appear isomorphic or symmetrical with one’s 
desire. It governs how the subject historically (or autobiographically) apprehends 
and systematically distorts reality.
 Unconscious fantasy achieves distorted expression in visual and spatial forms. 
Fascist spectacles, for example, are notoriously centered and symmetrical, intended 
to be seen only head-on. This makes the viewing subject feel he is at the center of 
things; in reality, of course, the whole design dwarfs and belittles him. It offers him 
the glory of reveling in “total” fulfillment, but its psychical appeal requires a subject 
who feels utterly devoid of power and satisfaction: the fantasy supplies their lack. 
An American architectural example, not directly connected with fascism, is Philip 
Johnson’s AT&T Building in New York. Johnson’s rather traditional skyscraper 
ends in a roofline designed to honor (by imitation) the top of a Queen Anne style 
dresser or highboy. The architect is establishing that there is no distinction between 
domestic and public, social space; the ease of the architectural simile provides the 
viewer a familiar, comforting place in public, civic space: he is there as though 
in his own living room; no anonymous citizen, but the king of his home. (The 
AT&T building was not loved, however; efforts to reinforce the subject’s sense of 
its “true” place in the fantasy often fall flat when they are too obvious or direct.)
Across the opening delineated by the fantasy frame, in fact, there is drawn something 
that absolutely divides the subject from its own lost object—at the same time as 
it is also the screen on which the subject projects its unconscious amendment of 
reality. Slavoj Žižek (1997) vividly paints fantasy’s frame:
fantasy is the very screen that separates desire from drive: it tells the story which 
allows the subject to (mis)perceive the void around which drive circulates as the 
primordial loss constitutive of desire. In other words, fantasy provides a rationale 
for the inherent deadlock of desire; it constructs the scene in which the jouissance 
we are deprived of is concentrated in the Other who stole it from us [pp. 33–34].
 (Jouissance is the French word for enjoyment, bliss, orgasm, and a number of 
other nuances. Lacan uses it to mean the satisfaction of a drive, not an instinct. 
The word is now commonly used in English in its French form. See MacCannell, 
2003b.)
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 The task of analysis would then seem to be to grasp the unconscious fantasy 
mechanism at work behind the screen that curtains off the jouissance that lies just 
behind, or just on the other side, of the gap or aperture that fantasy screens. Focused 
on this singular moment, analysis becomes largely a procedure for revealing the 
secrets of the patient’s vanished time, and the discordant, warring temporalities 
that disturb and destroy his or her mental balance.
 Yet if we begin to attend to space as well as time, we realize that once an 
analysis has reached this point, Freud actually makes a new departure, and does 
something that no temporal approach anticipates. He does not attempt to gain 
access to the lost moment, nor does he try to pierce the veil of fantasy that conceals 
it. Not directly. Instead he presents a fundamental alternative to the patient’s time 
and history, an alternative devoid of temporal character. To divine what is hiding 
in the unconscious, Freud sets up what he calls a “construction” (Freud, 1937 and 
1918).
 Freud was certainly the first to bring out starkly the two-step, interrupted time 
of trauma and the unseen manner in which the past continuously places a warp 
into conscious memory and present perception. But he is rarely acknowledged for 
being equally innovative in inventing the construction as a spatial metaphor for its 
treatment: a singular construction, in which moment and place, time and space, 
are not easily separable. In perhaps the most notable example, Freud’s patient, the 
“Wolfman,” has a dream in the course of his analysis that is so vividly visual he 
is able to draw Freud its picture. The “Wolfman” describes the dream this way: 
a window sash is suddenly thrown open to reveal a tree outside in which several 
white wolves with upright tails sit staring at him.
 After searching together through the patient’s childhood fairy tale books for 
a historical or biographical source of this precise image, Freud decides to take a 
different tack. Rather than trying to cross the barrier the patient has raised in front of 
his trauma, Freud now rearranges the setting that appears in the Wolfman’s screen-
dream. The theory is that the Wolfman’s fantasy is erected on the very site of the 
original trauma; a site Freud calls the “primal scene.” This scene is not the object 
of a perception or the subject of historical verification, for it is neither real nor 
unreal, neither an actual event nor a fantasied one. Freud reaches it only indirectly. 
He will not break through the fantasy screen, but he will subject its dreamscape to a 
remarkable series of spatial reversals that will mark out the presence of the trauma 
it conceals.
 Freud first rotates the dreamer’s position inside the dream: now the window that 
flies open is not something looked at but something looked through: the aperture 
becomes the infant’s own eyelids, startled suddenly apart. The infant, who is now 
the one who sees (and not the one stared at by the set of pale wolves), finds its 
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visual object transformed into the darkly hirsute figure of his own lupine father, 
as he mounts the child’s mother the same way that a furry, four-legged animal 
sexually enters his female (Freud uses the Latin phrase for “from behind”: a tergo). 
The scene’s trauma is constituted by the alternate appearance and disappearance 
of his father’s penis; an alternation that makes this into the scene, then, of the 
Wolfman’s encounter with castration (Freud, 1918; 1955, p. 45).
 Freud has thus redesigned the setting of his patient’s traumatic scene by carefully 
but dramatically shifting the spatial coordinates of the subject embedded in the 
fantasy scene that had masked or screened it off. Once Freud turns his patient’s 
dream space around, he rearticulates the Wolfman to his fantasy constructs in an 
entirely new way, so that the truth of the castration anxiety hidden in them can now 
be “seen.”
 Lacan (1973) eventually offered Freud’s radical reversals of space a proper 
name: anamorphosis. But from the very start, Freud already granted due weight to 
the spatial element in mentation: his story of the origin of the infant’s mental life 
begins with its turn away from the source. In The Project for a Scientific Psychology 
(1897–1903, p. 283), Freud theorizes that normal mentation quite simply arises 
from the anamorphic spatial turn, when the baby turns aside from its frontal view 
of the breast—the fount of satisfaction—so it now sees the breast only in profile. 
This evokes the formation of a mental image of the now-absent breast: one that still 
satisfies, but only imaginarily.
 Freud’s therapeutic move with the Wolfman is the same move as the baby’s 
in reverse: by reorienting his patient’s mental space completely crosswise to the 
space of the fantasy that harbors and preserves the trauma, Freud turns his patient’s 
glance aside, which then permits him to (re)construct the Wolfman’s primal 
scene, where he finds the stillness at the center of the Wolfman’s whirling drive 
energy—the whole history of the patient’s recurrent failures in life and love, and 
his compulsion to replicate again and again the lost causes of his peculiar sexuality. 
(The “Wolfman,” for example, falls in love with any woman he happens to see 
from behind in a kneeling position, fixating sexually her posterior.) Freud builds 
an alternative construction of the primal scene in order to supplant the Wolfman’s 
already-in-place fantasy edifice, and to redirect his patient’s drive energy down 
different paths.
 At a certain moment, that is, the analyst–patient couple had reached the point 
where time was at a stop, the time of the patient’s history and of the progression of 
the analysis. This sticking point is a dead, unmoving instant, which has nonetheless 
been the power source of all the psychical energy transporting the patient through 
time and motivating the shape of his psychical “reality.”
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  At this point of stubbornness, the adamancy and immovability of his traumatic, 
buried memory resists any and all change that might be wrought by time and 
experience.
 And as Freud found, this point remains to be grasped less as a moment in 
time than as a point in space. For there, in the middle of the coursing stream of 
subjective time stands something petrified, stony, unbudging—something with 
dimensionality, with weight, yet empty and insubstantial. An opaque, traumatic 
spot, a thing of obdurate resistance to time, change, and reality. The very thing, 
indeed, that amplifies the natural nervous energy gushing past it, by converting 
it into something far more powerful than the stream of experience generated 
by itself: a psychical turbine, so to speak, in the middle of the river of time that 
constitutes the subject’s history, a history that has flowed from this spot at the 
same rate as his conscious memory has fled from it. (Lacan makes this analogy: “a 
hydroelectric plant set midstream in a great river, the Rhine, for example” [“une 
usine hydraulique électrique qui est en plein milieu du courant d’un grand fleuve, 
le Rhin par exemple”]; by cumulating and augmenting natural forces [energy] it 
contributes to the constructed, fantasmatic character of Wirklichkeit [reality]. Lacan 
1994, pp. 32–33).
 Once Freud makes his “construction,” time loses its simple orientation. The past 
tense becomes indivisible from an other past that is inexplicably and unbearably still 
present in it. Freud calls this uncanny point of time-space “drive”—death drive—
and Lacan calls it pulsion (“impulsion”: Lacan distinguished drive from natural 
instinct, and translated Freud’s Trieb into this quasi-mechanical equivalent). Death 
drive is the transubstantiation of time into space: into a compulsive circling that 
has all the trappings of a temporal movement, but which is actually stuck, cycling 
around a traumatic point of fixed, almost mineral immobility. With drive, time is 
trumped by space, and Kant’s antinomian mental coordinates are discovered as 
coeval and co-equal.
Truth and Consequences
Once the threshold of fantasy has been crossed figuratively by analysis, where do 
we go? Two clear directions have appeared since Freud, the one speculative and 
temporal and the other plastic and three-dimensional. The philosophical, speculative 
option takes a good hard look at fantasy and suggests that the subject should 
realistically resign himself to the fact that if the fantasy frame is deconstructed, the 
death-drive that motivated its construction will appear in all its stark horror. The 
philosophical option accepts a “dead end” to analysis, just as it accepts the same of 
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time and history. The other, “architectural” option adopts a somewhat sunnier view 
of human possibilities and sheds a different light on what Freud’s spatial method 
might bring.
 The consequences to disattending the spatial dimension of Freud’s analysis are 
grave. Slavoj Žižek, who calls himself a “philosopher of psychoanalytic ontology” 
(1997), faces squarely the fact that the screen and frame of fantasy are never finally 
or fully breached. Analysis, he points out, ends with a “traversal of the fantasy” that 
“suspend[s] the fantasmic frame of unwritten rules that tell us how to choose freely” 
(p. 29). But this does not mean breaking “through the screen” (p. 30) or liberating 
ourselves from the restrictive viewpoint of fantasy. Žižek instead emphasizes, 
using the late Lacan, that at the end of analysis, the subject at last apprehends 
that death drive alone lies beyond the screen of projected desires: “Once we move 
beyond desire—that is to say, beyond the fantasy which sustains desire—we enter 
the strange domain of drive: the domain of the closed circular palpitation which 
finds satisfaction in endlessly repeating the same failed gesture” (p. 30).
 According to Žižek’s interpretation, a successful analysis destroys all the 
illusions fashioned to dissimulate the finite character of death drive, which Žižek 
calls “a radical closure” (p. 31)—or nothing other than the “end” of time.
 Žižek argues vigorously that what one usually thinks of as the aim of analysis 
(as “opening” the subject to his or her possibilities), is simply a way to “maintain 
[a] false opening (the idea that the excluded choice might have happened)” (p. 33). 
Any analysis that supported this vain hope is destined for disappointment. Instead, 
Žižek affirms the end of analysis to be an impasse where the drive that endlessly 
cycles around an impossibly lost object is finally and fully realized.
 Moreover, Žižek counsels acceptance of this “unbearable closure of being” (p. 
30); thus, he asks: “What if ‘traversing the fantasy’ involves the acceptance of a 
radical ontological closure? The unbearable aspect of the ‘eternal return of the 
same’—the Nietzschean name for the crucial dimension of drive—is the radical 
closure this notion implies: to endorse and fully assume the ‘eternal return of the 
same’” (p. 31).
 Such acceptance, Žižek goes on to say, actually yields another sort of enjoyment, 
one more profound than its original model: a joy-in-death-drive, if you will. Like all 
revolutionary fervors, it comes from renouncing any hope and all faith in the false 
promises of “opening.” He writes that in “the ‘eternal return of the same’ . . . we 
renounce every opening, every belief in messianic Otherness” (p. 31); moreover, 
“in ‘traversing the fantasy,’ we find jouissance in the vicious cycle of circulating 
around the void of the (missing) object, renouncing the myth that jouissance has to 
be amassed somewhere else” (pp. 33–34).
 Satisfaction is (philosophically at least) rediscovered at—and as—the last 
moment.
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 But Žižek’s hyperbolic conclusions are clouded somewhat by his deeper neglect 
of space. Just as his mesmerizing analyses of cultural objects spiral round and 
round their several possible interpretations (following an essentially Hegelian time, 
with its own end to history), his “psychoanalytic ontology” presents itself in The 
Plague of Fantasies as one-sidedly temporal. For Žižek, the opposite of time is 
not space, but eternity; and like Hegel’s, this is an essentially religious viewpoint. 
Žižek “endorses and fully assumes” an “end-time” that realizes itself as a perpetual 
whirl emptying into a void.
 Žižek (1997, p. 31) assumes that “the point is . . . to oppose the radical closure 
of the ‘eternal’ drive to the opening involved in the finitude/temporality of the 
desiring subject.” But what, after all, is Žižek’s “unbearable closure of being” when 
looked at spatially? Surely it is no more, nor less, than that final empty space, the 
one awaiting us all at the end of our time: the grave. When we are face to face with 
time’s deadest point, psychoanalytic ontology, even at its most radical, must stop; 
logically so, for it is organized by what is.
 Žižek’s antisentimental view of the analytic experience, while plainly consonant 
with Freud’s demystifying spirit, is nonetheless more than just quizzically awry with 
respect to Freud’s analytic aims. If the orientation of psychoanalysis is primarily 
retrospective, then Žižek would be correct that its final goal has to be to reach 
the zero point of time where drive energizes the fantasy that masks it, and where 
eternity offers the only alternative perspective on that time.
 But, to turn the tables a bit, let me ask whether the spatial reorientation of 
the fundamental fantasy Freud effected in the Wolfman does not offer an entirely 
different resolution to the traversal of fantasy from the resignation Žižek envisages 
(and recommends)? Aren’t there other possible lines of flight from this stillest of 
all points? After all, Freud took full responsibility for shifting the Wolfman off his 
position in the fantasy scene. Everything had been nicely arranged in his fantasy so 
as to screen off knowledge of the primal scene of his trauma. With the anamorphotic 
shift in subjective perspective that Freud insists on for the Wolfman’s dream, a 
wholly different prospect materializes for his patient and provides them both with 
a crucial perspective on the Wolfman’s truth.
 Once it is space, not time, that is psychoanalytically reversed, the architectural 
option for traversing the fantasy emerges. A “radical” architecture, set toward new 
departures (not ending up back at the uterine enclosure), can also move us around 
inside our fantasy spaces: a radical architecture that turns its subject sideways, 
making him look in the unexpected direction—back through the fantasy frame 
that obscures his past and present realities. The stake of spatial psychoanalysis and 
radical architecture alike would be to re-start subjective time by treating it with 
space, providing a spatial prospect for a mental gaze blinded by the fantasy of what 
“is” to the critical importance of what “is not.”
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Architecture in Psychoanalysis II: Critical Space
Let me begin where Freud so often did, with everyday reality (the one I am saying 
is shaped by unconscious fantasy). Everyone knows from the daily papers what 
intense emotional reactions innovative architecture stirs up whenever it appears to 
establish some new or aberrant kind of object: an object that departs in an elemental 
way from the ordinary “objects of desire” that constitute our world, by substituting 
for and screening off the lethal satisfaction of our final objective, death drive.
 When it comes to the passions this type of created object brings out, 
psychoanalytic insight is rare. This is understandably so, since psychoanalysis 
has tended to give priority to time over space, which it often sees largely as the 
surrogate or stand-in for the lost object. For example, a psychoanalyst friend once 
remarked: “Don’t you think architects love their mothers too much?” The remark 
indicated to me that he regarded the task of analysis as chiefly a matter of reversing 
time, with space as little more than the representative of the time outside of human 
time. He also obviously took it for granted that architected space was a container 
or enclosure; that architectural space symbolized either a return to the womb or 
foreshadowed the tomb. (In a recent paper for Yale University 2003, I question this 
fundamental assumption).
 Something more fundamental is nonetheless at stake in the question of space 
in and for psychoanalysis. To repeat my original question: why do so few objects 
(apart from legendarily scandalous art objects) raise as much emotional commotion 
as architectural ones? And why do those who react so viscerally to architecture do 
so in such highly affective and extremely personal ways? It is as if innovative 
architecture disturbed some deep layer of existence that puts the fundamental 
structure of the world (or our fantasy place in it) in danger—or at least in doubt.
 Consider a whole host of unique architectural projects proposed in the last few 
years for San Francisco: Rem Koolhaas’s new Prada store, wrapped in a stainless 
steel exterior pierced at regular intervals by uniform holes, was immediately hated 
and labeled a big “cheese grater”; the new, copper clad de Young Museum in 
Golden Gate Park by Herzog and de Meuron features a tower people instantly 
found reminiscent of a prison. Visceral, emotional reactions to architecture are often 
characterized by a tendency to link the new architectural object to some familiar, 
everyday object (for example, a cheese grater) that, in its gigantic appearance 
as a major edifice, are then deemed ridiculously “out of place.” Yet in contrast, 
objections to “developments” that blanket hundreds or thousands of acres with 
uniform, unimaginative houses are generally voiced affect-neutrally, and couched 
impersonally: expressing, for example, fear of potentially negative environmental 
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consequences, not how uneasy they might make us feel. One objects to them, as 
it were, for the sake of “nature,” and not because these built environments might 
well produce negative mental effects. This is because uniform and completely 
predictable buildings, installed in conventional, gridded spaces, model a ready-
made psychical reality into whose fantasy picture we have already fitted ourselves 
in a conventional location, our “proper place.”
 What, then, would a Freudian revolution in space look like architecturally—or 
to put it another way, what kind of architecture could invert the reactions noted 
above? As I researched this paper, I found that it probably would not look like 
“postmodern” architecture. Postmodern architecture deploys the same neo-
Hegelian temporality as Žižek’s, which invokes the “end of history”; similarly, 
postmodernism promotes the infinite “recycling” of established forms. While the 
postmodern avoids the trap of neoclassicism by deploying discordant techniques to 
collage forms from long-ago historical styles and disparate cultures, its aim is still 
the same as the one outlined by Žižek: to collapse or telescope time into a greater 
“all-time” that, in fusing with the end of time, becomes an imitation of eternity and 
a jouissance of an “eternal return of the same.”
 There are nonetheless architectural indicators of other possibilities. It would 
seems obvious to begin with Frank Gehry, the architect who so clearly challenged 
the customary way we “see” ourselves in space. His Bilbao Guggenheim breaks 
away from the conventional framing of space that supports our fantasies of the 
familiar. But there is more to be learned from another contemporary architect, 
Emilio Ambasz. At least that was my first, and now lasting, impression of his 
work.
 To look at Ambasz’s work is to wonder, “What if, instead of trying to go through 
the rabbit hole or the fantasy frame to the horror behind it—the missing object; the 
whirling void of death drive; or the end of time—we refused to question the frame 
and simply turned aside and looked through the frame anamorphically?” What 
would happen, that is, if we looked upon the kind of life that might materialize before 
our now repositioned gaze. Wouldn’t it mean that the endpoint of fantasy’s frame 
could no longer be considered only as the bottomless pit of unreal foundations, but 
a revolutionary vantage point on ourselves, and our future selves?
Emilio Ambasz: The Architectural Object versus the Lost Object
Emilio Ambasz has described his architecture as the “pursuit of alternative futures” 
(Sorkin, 2004, p. 108). Ambasz’s creations are often portrayed as having a distinctly 
uncontemporary, almost atemporal feel; some even argue they purvey the sense of 
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the mythic time before time, while others honestly describe their reactions as the 
opposite: that Ambasz seems to be looking towards an enigmatic future in which 
our entire relation to time, space, and nature will be fully disclosed. 
 Neither orientation—past or future—is quite adequate to his opus. His enigmatic 
architecture, at the very least, reverses the retrospective temporal orientation, and 
thereby the directives, usually ascribed to psychoanalysis—and that psychoanalysis 
usually ascribes to architecture. Still, what Ambasz really engages is not entirely 
obvious. His best interpreters agree that time seems somehow implicated in his 
architecture, but also that it is secondary to, or even dependent on, his innovations 
with space. Lauren Ledofsky, for example, describes Ambasz as “bring[ing] 
forth the earth” when he half-buries more or less “canonical” buildings (such as 
a Mediterranean villa), and thus enables what Ledofsky calls the “emergence of 
the earth over and against architecture” (Ledofsky, 2004, p. 44). Indeed, the motto 
of Ambasz’s architectural enterprise is “Green over Gray,” or, in other words, 
landscape over architecture (Ambasz, 2004).
 In Ambasz’s world, the habitants of the earth appear to be comparatively few and 
they seem not to have marked (or ruined) nature in any highly visible or indelible 
way. Yet they are not dwarfed by the “nature” they dwell in, either. Ambasz’s works 
are unmistakably human-oriented creations that—although indeed often half-
buried, with unclear exits and entrances and with no obvious ways of escape or 
lines of flight from them—are nonetheless often islands of a peace and a harmony 
that simply do not appear in a vertical, temporal perspective (eternal time) in which 
man is under earth and both are under God. It is not the unruffled calm of a perfect 
consonance with nature that Ambasz’s buildings exhibit.
 For his buildings, while pictured as balanced in and not merely on the earth, 
are nonetheless suffused with a striking potential energy that could break in any 
of several ways, some terrifying, some radiant. In fact, the seemingly obvious idea 
of green-over-gray does not really describe how Ambasz’s architecture actually 
relates to the earth. In one project, for example, he attempted to build a lake in 
a park that tilted at a 45-degree angle. His fellow architects are often quickest to 
comprehend that Ambasz’s earth is perhaps as far from ‘natural’ as possible. As 
Ettore Sottsass remarks, “Ambasz’s earth is not at all the picturesque botanical 
compendium of the pastoral” (cited in Ledofsky, 2004, p. 42); while Robert Wines 
terms Ambasz’s a “Daliesque Landscape” (Wines, 2004, p. 89).
 Some writers suspect Ambasz of an undue “maternal attachment” because he sets 
his architectural objects into their landscapes in such a way that they cannot really 
be detached from them: they could not be constructed just anywhere. But this view 
ignores that he subjects his buildings’ landscapes to the same powerful stresses, the 
same distinctive viewpoints, that he brings to bear on his constructions—and this 
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aspect of his architecture runs completely counter to the belief that Ambasz exalts 
ground over construct.
 Indeed, Ambasz’s architectural objects are neither laid in the earth—that is, 
fully swallowed by the grave—nor do they completely ignore this possible “end” 
to their history the way a housing development does. But it is also the case that 
Ambasz’s architecture is simply not looking toward time past as it cycles into a 
future that will merely repeat it, at a higher or lower level. He is instead moving 
space off of the opposing yet fused temporal axes we try to reduce it to—vertical, 
synchronic, eternal time; flowing diachronic time—that hold it within a familiar, 
fantasy framing.
 In Casa de Retiro Espiritual (figure 1), this marvel of a house, Ambasz disorients 
space in an especially anamorphic way: as if a wall that should surround was 
swiveled aside, and the stairs that should lead to an interior look at first as if they 
go nowhere, and then seem to lead the visitor out before they lead him in. The 
result: the house makes a departure, disclosing a direction for time and experience 
that only a twist in space can really convey. Instead of unearthing the natural past 
or the archaic legacy of buried horrors, Ambasz’s architectural objects materialize 
a space that confounds our fantasies of nature and history and produces something 
else—which is, for Lacan, the elementary form of desire: “le désir d’autre chose” 
(the desire for something else) (Lacan, 1994, p. 303).
FIGURE 1. Casa de Retiro Espiritual, Emilio Ambasz, Cordoba.
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 Of his own work, Ambasz writes that “sometimes I fancy myself to be the last 
man of the present culture, building a house for the first man of a culture that has 
not yet arrived” (in Sorkin, 2004, p. 86).
In this paper I have argued that space for Freud was as crucial a factor as time 
in the work of analysis, and that contemporary practitioners might be advised to 
reconsider its potential importance in treatment. If a fundamental fantasy shapes 
the patient’s subjective life, and operates specifically by blocking access to his 
or her initial trauma, the effort to break its frame—to reach the time before the 
original traumatic moment—are not necessarily the only, or even the most effective, 
approach. By its very nature, fantasy bars the way to the time before its construction; 
and though a philosopher of will like Žižek might believe we can force a face-to-
face confrontation with our subjective origin (and end) by traversing the fantasy, 
the result is ambiguous at best: we meet the death drive in ourselves, and this 
becomes its own form of satisfaction.
 A rather different path is available to the analyst, with a different possible 
outcome. That is to take the fantasy for what it is, a spatial conceit. The analyst’s 
task would be to discover where the subject has positioned itself and secreted his lost 
satisfactions in this unconscious fantasy picture; and then to reorient the subject’s 
spatial position inside the fantasy. Apocalyptic breakthroughs to original time are 
rendered unnecessary, because the positional shift opens its own vista on what the 
subject has hidden away in the fantasy: a sense of its overwhelmingly defining loss 
(e.g., the Wolfman’s fear of castration). It can do this, moreover, without forcing the 
ultimate destination—subjective destitution before death drive—that postmodern 
psychoanalytic ontology stipulates.
 Architecture, wherever its spatial reorientations can dislodge us from the 
predictable traps, dead-ends, and blind corners we unconsciously cement ourselves 
into, can offer this same opening. At its most imaginative, that is, architecture may 
serve as one of the finer metaphors for the significance of Freud’s achievement in 
making a space where we can see our “world”—and ourselves in it—otherwise.
 Good art can make the same subjective difference good analysis makes: artists, 
Freud said, are out ahead of analysts, who only follow their path. In this essay, I 
hope to have made this case also for radical architecture, which can begin to take 
its place as a powerful guide to a new, spatially oriented form of psychoanalytic 
treatment. Great architecture—anonymous, quotidian, or produced by a singular 
brilliance—can even perhaps now be defined as something that creates a “new” 
scene for human dreaming, by performing its own virtual/virtuoso analysis of 
where culture is “stuck” and where we are “stuck” in it (or with it) by virtue of our 
unconscious fantasies. Any transformative, revolutionary effect that architecture 
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may realize will parallel—and will not simply imitate—Freud’s crucial method: 
identifying the conservative unconscious indirectly expressed in conventional 
fantasies, and articulating how we are caught up in and by it.
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